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Contracts II - Hatcher 2017, Study notes of Contract Law

UCC and R2d terms for entire semester; Terms and Case briefs for midterm

Typology: Study notes

2016/2017

Uploaded on 04/24/2017

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TERMS
Options and Firm Offers
Option K – A separate K with separate consideration that makes an offer to enter into another K irrevocable for
a time.
When offer is irrevocable (exceptions to freely revocable rule):
Option K w/ real consideration (money has changed hands)
Option K w/o real consideration (fake consideration money has not changed hands but consideration
has been discussed --- “I will give you a dollar”)
UCC 2-205 Firm Offers
Promissory Estoppel
Unless an exception applies, any attempted revocation of a valid option K is generally ineffective, even if:
There is a counteroffer
Offeror dies, or
Offeror loses capacity (if the person becomes incapacitated).
Promissory Estoppel
An offer in which the offeror should
1) reasonably expect an offer to induce action or forbearance of a
2) substantial character and which does induce is enforceable to the extent that it is
3) necessary to avoid injustice.
Buyer’s option – Buyer can buy as much or as little from seller as they choose.
Requirements K K in which the buyer agrees to buy all its requirements of a certain item from the
seller
SEE CASE: Drennan vs. Baird
Firm Offers
U.C.C. 2-205: An offer by a 1) merchant to buy or sell 2) goods, in 3) signed writing, which gives
assurance that it will be held open and is irrevocable, for lack of consideration , during the time stated
or is not time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event can the offer remain open for longer than
three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately
signed by the offeror.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Unjust EnrichmentWhere one party is unjustly benefited by the actions of another which were done
with the expectation of compensation (hospital saving the life of unconscious patient).
Different from promissory estoppel; not based on a promise. Unjust enrichment is an
independent cause of action where claimant conferred a benefit on recipient and it is unjust for
the recipient to keep the benefit without paying for it.
Elements:
1) Unjust – Compensation is appropriate only where it is just and equitable under the
circumstances.
2) Enrichment – A benefit was conferred. Cannot be officious or gratuitous.
3) Benefit must be of the degree where it would be unjust for benefited party to keep it
without paying for it.
Restitution The remedy for unjust enrichment. Measured by market standard --- quantum meruit or
quantum valebant. Used when no breach of K, but yes damages.
Quantum Meruit“As much as deserved” – Market value of services.
Quantum Valebant“As much as they are worth” – Market value of goods.
Specific Restitution – The return of a specific object (grandma’s locket).
Quasi KK implied in law – Not a real K. Treated as such for procedural purpose of fitting into K form
of action. Occurs when one side has been unjustly enriched.
Implied in Fact: “real” contract -- K inferred from actions rather than express agreement -
actions indicating mutual assent so law infers bargain to pay (example of calling a plumber to fix
leaky faucet)
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TERMS

Options and Firm Offers Option K – A separate K with separate consideration that makes an offer to enter into another K irrevocable for a time. When offer is irrevocable (exceptions to freely revocable rule):

  • Option K w/ real consideration (money has changed hands)
  • Option K w/o real consideration (fake consideration – money has not changed hands but consideration has been discussed --- “I will give you a dollar”)
  • UCC 2-205 Firm Offers
  • Promissory Estoppel

Unless an exception applies, any attempted revocation of a valid option K is generally ineffective, even if:

  • There is a counteroffer
  • Offeror dies, or
  • Offeror loses capacity (if the person becomes incapacitated).

Promissory Estoppel

  • An offer in which the offeror should
      1. reasonably expect an offer to induce action or forbearance of a
      1. substantial character and which does induce is enforceable to the extent that it is
      1. necessary to avoid injustice.
  • Buyer’s option – Buyer can buy as much or as little from seller as they choose.
  • Requirements K – K in which the buyer agrees to buy all its requirements of a certain item from the seller
  • SEE CASE: Drennan vs. Baird Firm Offers
  • U.C.C. 2-205: An offer by a 1) merchant to buy or sell 2) goods, in 3) signed writing, which gives assurance that it will be held open and is irrevocable , for lack of consideration , during the time stated or is not time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event can the offer remain open for longer than three months ; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

  • Unjust Enrichment Where one party is unjustly benefited by the actions of another which were done with the expectation of compensation (hospital saving the life of unconscious patient). - Different from promissory estoppel; not based on a promise. Unjust enrichment is an independent cause of action where claimant conferred a benefit on recipient and it is unjust for the recipient to keep the benefit without paying for it. - Elements: ■ 1) Unjust – Compensation is appropriate only where it is just and equitable under the circumstances. ■ 2) Enrichment – A benefit was conferred. Cannot be officious or gratuitous. ■ (^) 3) Benefit must be of the degree where it would be unjust for benefited party to keep it without paying for it.
  • Restitution The remedy for unjust enrichment. Measured by market standard --- quantum meruit or quantum valebant. Used when no breach of K, but yes damages. - Quantum Meruit “As much as deserved” – Market value of services. - Quantum Valebant “As much as they are worth” – Market value of goods. - Specific Restitution – The return of a specific object (grandma’s locket).
  • Quasi K K implied in law – Not a real K. Treated as such for procedural purpose of fitting into K form of action. Occurs when one side has been unjustly enriched. - Implied in Fact : “real” contract -- K inferred from actions rather than express agreement - actions indicating mutual assent so law infers bargain to pay (example of calling a plumber to fix leaky faucet)
  • Implied in Law : legal fiction – “quasi contract” - not a real K - benefit not requested – to prevent unjust enrichment court implies K
  • Volunteer Person who confers a benefit gratuitously.
  • Officious Intermeddler Confers a benefit (presumed that person receiving didn’t want/ask for it) with intent to be paid, but it was unsolicited and the circumstances did not imply that s/he expected payment.
  • Capricious Intermeddler Same thing as officious intermeddler.
  • Material Benefit Rule: General K principle: Promise for a past consideration generally not enforceable.
  • For there to be consideration, exchange needs to be simultaneous.
  • Used to imply consideration when one party has a moral obligation, and is “seeking” to have that obligation relieved.
  • Very narrow exception -- courts avoided this “past consideration doctrine” by exception called “moral obligation doctrine” – where a person makes a promise that is a ratification of an existing but unenforceable or voidable legal obligation

POLICING DOCTRINES

  • Traditional K principle is not to consider the state of mind of the parties. Consider objective manifestation of assent instead.
  • BUT courts have become concerned with unfair results when too rigid of an application of this principle
    • where one party’s assent occurs for bad reasons – result in doctrines that can be used to protect the “innocent” party.
  • Can be used affirmatively or defensively.
    • Is there a K?
    • If NOT> is there an alternative (such as Promissory Estoppel)
    • If K> is there a defense to formation (such as Misrepresentation and other policing doctrines)
  • Remedies if one of the policing doctrines applies:
    • Void – Neither party can enforce K.
    • Voidable – Injured party can “avoid.”
    • Damages – Keep K and excise bad terms and/or seek damages

MISREPRESENTATION

  • Misrepresentation RS 159: An assertion not in accordance with the facts.
  • (^) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient. - Two Types: Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Material Misrepresentation ■ (1) A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the maker - (a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or - (b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or - (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion ■ (2) A misrepresentation is material if it would be - (^) – likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, - – or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so
  • Factual Assertion Representation that a fact exists.
  • Promise Commitment to do something in the future.
  • Fraud in the Inducement Misrepresentation related to a fact that forms the basis of the K and falsely gives other party incentive to enter into the K (most common) (“Sell me your house for $1 million,” --- contract actually says “$1”).
  • Fraud in the Factum Misrepresentation of what the K is (“Please sign this recommendation letter.” – Boss signs without reading – actually a huge employment K). - Types of Fraud: ■ (^) Affirmative Fraud – Lying about the facts. ■ Concealment Fraud – Actively hiding the facts. ■ Nondisclosure Fraud – Not mentioning the facts.

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Procedural Unconscionability Refers to the manner in which the K was formed. Requires:

  • Oppression Where a K involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice.
  • Surprise Where the unconscionable provision is hidden within a printed form.

■ (^) Substantive Unconscionability Refers to the subject matter of the K. Concerns whether a provision reallocates risks in objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.

  • Sliding Scale Rule Both elements of unconscionability must be met, but do not have to be equally present (More procedurally unconscionability requires less substantive, and vice-versa).
  • Adhesion K K where one party has far superior bargaining power and says “take it or leave it.” Other party has zero power to negotiate or change the terms of the K. Good first step toward procedural unconscionability but does not establish it.

ILLEGAL Ks

  • Illegal K Agreement reached to do something against the law. Does not have to be criminal to be illegal.
  • (^) In pari delicto ( potior est conditio defendentis ) Parties are equally culpable. Court will sometimes uphold illegal Ks if the parties are not in pari delicto. - When they are: favors defendant because court will likely not get involved.
  • General Rule: Courts will not uphold illegal K.
  • When not to apply the general rule:
    • When the public cannot be protected because the transaction has already been completed.
    • Where no serious moral turpitude (depravity; wickedness) is involved.
    • Where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault.
    • Where the defendant will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.
  • SEE CASE: Danzig

INCAPACITY

  • Incapacity The quality of being incapable of making a K at the time of K formation. Two types:
    • Minority When an individual has not yet reached the age of majority. ■ Generally , minors cannot bind themselves in Ks, and can avoid, barring a few exceptions. ■ One who Ks with a minor can still be bound if minor chooses. ■ If minor makes a K, if ratified once minor reaches the age of majority or within a reasonable time thereafter , the K is valid and “minor” is then bound.
    • Mental Incapacity When a person is mentally deficient at time of K formation (extreme age, mental disease, brain injury, etc). ■ Party asserting this claim has burden to prove that he or she was mentally incapacitated at the time of K formation (not after the fact). ■ If individual was capable at time of K formation, the K is valid.
  • Cognitive Test – At the time of K, party must have such a severe mental illness that he/she was completely unable to understand the nature and consequences of the transaction - All or nothing. When a party cannot possibly understand the K (psychotic break/schizoid).
  • Motivational Test – Where even though party may have understood the transaction, the mental illness affected her ability to act rationally in relation to the K - When a party can understand the K, but not the consequences (manic/depressive).
  • (^) SEE CASE: Bone Breakers Wrestling

INTERPRETATION

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  • Ambiguous / unambiguous test:
      1. Can we know the intent of the parties?
      1. What would a reasonable person in the parties’ positions expect? (R.P.S.)
  • If a term is ambiguous, we can look at the correspondence between the parties.
  • (^) Interpretation The process of discerning the meaning reasonably intended by the parties. Can either be actual terms or circumstances.
  • Construction Where the court adds K terms by legal implication – the process by which courts measure the parties’ intentions.
  • Interpretation Hierarchy (1 is highest)
      1. Course of Performance – Sequence of conduct between the parties during a particular transaction.
      1. Course of Dealing Sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions between the parties.
      1. Usage of Trade Practice or method with “such regularity of observance” as to justify expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question (industry standard).
  • Plain meaning approach to K interpretation The older, more traditional approach. Determines if the language is unambiguous by examining the words themselves and not considering anything outside of the K. Only if the meaning is not in the K does the court look at extrinsic evidence.
  • Modern Approach to K interpretation Considering and examining the words of the K based upon the circumstances and including extrinsic evidence.
  • Plain Meaning vs Modern Approach
    • Plain meaning approach - older traditional method in interpreting written agreements: courts first determine if language is ambiguous by looking to the plain meaning of the words without considering any other extrinsic evidence of circumstances, etc ■ Only if court determines language is ambiguous will the court consider extrinsic evidence
    • Modern approach - rejects the plain meaning approach and rather determines ambiguity by including consideration of extrinsic evidence
  • Standards of Preference
    • Reasonable, legal and effective interpretation over illegal and unreasonable and ineffective
    • Express terms greater than course of performance greater than course of dealing greater than usage of trade
    • Specific and exact terms over general language
    • Separately negotiated or added terms over standardized terms or terms not separately negotiated
  • (^) R2d – “Rules in Aid of Interpretation”
    • Words and conduct interpreted in light of the all the circumstances, and principle purpose (intent) of parties given great weight (if ascertainable)
    • Writing (and all parts) interpreted as a whole (notion of harmoniousness)
    • Unless different intent made clear, ■ Words interpreted according to general prevailing meaning ■ Technical terms given technical meaning if K is in that technical field
    • Performance accepted without objection is given great weight in interpretation of the agreement
    • Wherever possible, intent of the parties interpreted to be consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, dealings or usage of trade

CONSTRUCTION

  • Construction – Where a court adds implied terms that would have or should have included if they had thought about it. Such as: - An issue not considered. - An issue discussed but forgotten. - Contradictory evidence (when language is vague, and court can’t just rely on plain meaning.) - An unintended consequence, public policy concerns, etc.
  • Gap fillers:
  • Sometimes parties simply misunderstood each other --- there is no way they reached mutual assent, no meeting of the minds.
  • If misunderstanding is found, the K is void.
  • SEE CASE: Peerless
  • (^) Peerless case: When parties attach different meanings to important K terms and neither knows nor has reason to know of the misunderstanding, no K results.
  • It is rare for courts to find misunderstanding. Rather, courts more often find that one interpretation is preferred over the other.
  • Mistake The parties are mistaken as to the facts at the time of K formation. Whereas misunderstanding is when the parties attach different meaning to the same term, with mistake the parties reach an agreement where one or both parties are mistaken about the circumstances or facts that exist at the time of K formation
  • RS Elements (pg. 669)

■ 1) A mistake

■ (^) 2) of both parties

■ 3) at the time of K formation

■ 4) as to a basic assumption of the K

■ 5) that has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performance

  • Analysis is often “who should bear the risk of the mistake.”
  • Unilateral Mistake When only one party is mistaken as to facts at time of K formation.

■ In order for the mistake to be a valid defense, asserting party must be shown that the enforcement of the K is unconscionable or that the other party knew or had reason to know of the mistake

  • Mutual Mistake When both parties are mistaken as the circumstances surrounding the K at the time of K formation
  • Mistake and expression and reformation:
  • Reformation – If mistake expression is in the K, the court may rescind the K, but it may also engage in construction, adding K terms or reforming them to fix the term.

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

  • Regarding mistake doctrines, application is only to errors of fact in existence at time of K formation.
  • Impracticability and Frustration of Purpose deal with changes in events that occur after K formation.
    • General idea: Changed circumstances make the contracted performance so contrary to the assumptions made at the time of K that the basic premises of the K have been undermined.
  • Crucial issues in these doctrines, as in Mistake , are materiality and risk allocation
  • Impracticability When changed circumstances so drastically increase the burden on the party claiming relief that performance would be impracticable (impossible). - Two Types:Subjective Impracticability Where the party subjectively cannot perform or where performance is no longer worth it to him (“I cannot do it”). Does not relieve a party of his obligations. ■ Objective Impracticability Where no reasonable party would be able to perform under the circumstances, or where performance is literally impossible (“It cannot be done”). Does relieve a party of his obligations. - RS (2d) § 261. DISCHARE BY SUPERVENING IMPRACTICABILITY: Where, after a K is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable 1) without his fault 2) by the occurrence of an event, 3) the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the K was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language of the circumstances indicates the contrary. ■ (^) Elements: - 1) Without moving party’s fault - 2) Made impracticable by the occurrence of an event - 3) The non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which K was made. - UCC 2-615. EXCUSE BY FAILURE OF PRESUPPOSED CONDITIONS - Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation… a. Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller…. Is not a breach of his duty under a K for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the K was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid…
  • Frustration of Purpose The purpose for the K has arguably been frustrated. Both parties must have been aware of the intended purpose in order for this defense to hold. - Elements: ■ 1) the purpose that was frustrated was a principal purpose of the contracting party ■ 2) the frustration was substantial or severe (defeats the purpose) ■ 3) the event causing the frustration was not foreseeable to the parties when they entered into the contract. - RS (2d) § 265. DISCHARGE BY SUPERVENING FRUSTRATION: Where, after a K is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an even the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the K was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary
  • Impossibility due to death
    • RS (2d) § 262: If the existence of a particular person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as makes performance impracticable is an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the K was made

CONDITIONS AND PROMISES

  • ConditionRS (2d) § 224: An event, not certain to occur, which must occur before the performance under a K becomes due. - When making the K, the parties agreed that the obligations were contingent on the happening of an uncertain event.
  • Condition precedent – Gives rise to the duty to perform (Must happen before K takes effect).
  • Condition subsequent Extinguishes a duty to perform (Cannot happen after K takes effect, or else K void).
  • Can be of the same effect – comes down to how it’s drafted.
    • “If X happens, you must perform” = condition precedent , vs.
    • “You must perform, but if this happens, your performance is excused” = condition subsequent.
  • BURDEN OF PROOF FOR CONDITIONS :

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  • Partial breach – When the performance of the other party, although in breach, is not so significant as to fully release the non-breaching party – called substantial performance****. - Non-breaching party may not be able to terminate K but rather must pay the K price less damage that result from the breach.
  • (^) Unfair Forfeiture – Where enforcement of the K would cause disproportionate forfeiture to the other party. - If upholding of a condition would cause a disproportionate forfeiture the court can excuse it from the K, as long as it was not material. ■ Windfall Unexpected benefit gained when a condition is enforced. ■ Forfeiture Unexpected burden suffered when a condition is enforced.

CASES

Option Contracts & Firm Offers

Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (Promissory Estoppel)

  • Drennan, general contractor, making bid for a school job.
  • Subcontractor is lowest bidder, but then reneges claiming it had been mistaken in its bid.
  • General relied on the defendant’s bid. Sues for difference in price of the subcontracts.
  • Issue: Was Star Paving allowed to revoke? Should defendant have expected the plaintiff rely on the defendant’s bid?
  • Holding: Plaintiff relied on the defendant’s bid to make his own, and since he is held to his bid so too should the defendant since the mistake was the defendant’s.

Brooklyn Bagel Boys v. Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Products (Option and Requirements Ks)

  • The two parties were in the business of producing and packing bagels (plain. produced, def. packed)
  • Defendant decides to create its own formula for bagels.
  • K provided that either party could, at 90-day notice, terminate the K; defendant decides to terminate.
  • Issue: Was this a requirements K? Had defendant agreed to get all its bagel requirements from plaintiff?
  • Holding: Earthgrains has a “buyer’s option,” not a requirements Ks, meaning that they can buy as much or as little from Brooklyn Bagels as they choose.

Martin v. Little, Brown, and Co. (K implied both in fact and law and unjust enrichment)

  • Plaintiff offered to provide a copy of a book with plagiarized passages to defendant publisher.
  • Never mentioned compensation, but after demanded to be paid.
  • Issue: Did the actions of the parties constitute desire to K? Did the actions of the plaintiff leave the defendant unjustly enriched?
  • Holding: Plaintiff’s actions were voluntary ; he never made mention of compensation. It was unreasonable to expect compensation for services voluntarily offered when compensation was never discussed. No quasi-K because actions were voluntary --- benefit was not unjustly bestowed upon the defendant. Plaintiff was an officious intermeddler.

Feingold v. Pucello

  • Defendant car-accident victim was referred to plaintiff attorney as potential client.
  • Plaintiff did a lot of work without having been asked to do so.
  • Plaintiff sent his fee agreement to defendant, who rejected the agreement, found another attorney, and told plaintiff to keep all of the product of the work he had done.
  • Issue: Was there a meeting of the minds? Was there an implied K? Was there unjust enrichment for defendant? Did plaintiff reasonably believe that defendant intended to retain him?
  • Holding: Plaintiff actions were unreasonable; his exorbitant fee was enough to indicate to him that defendant may find another attorney. Defendant never asked for his services, nor did plaintiff imply that he intended to do the work or that he expected to be paid.

Estate of Cleveland v. Gordon

  • Plaintiff used own funds to pay her aunt’s medical bills.
  • Plaintiff had been told by banker at aunt’s bank that if plaintiff kept detailed records of her expenditures, she could be reimbursed by the aunt’s estate.
  • Niece wanted to be reimbursed and aunt knew it. Aunt told a friend that niece would “get everything [aunt] had, if there was anything left.”
  • Issue: Was the niece a “capricious intermeddler” who was not entitled to reimbursement because of her kinship? Was her gift reasonably perceived as gratuitous? Was she acting out of a sense of familial obligation?
  • Holding: There was an implicit understanding between niece and aunt that paying was not gratuitous. Plaintiff’s actions were out of a sense of familial obligation, not gratuity.
  • Plaintiff sues for misrepresentation to have the K rescinded.
  • Issue: Did the defendant have a duty to notify the plaintiff of the haunting, which decreased the value of the house?
  • Holding: The plaintiff did not accrue legal damages, but was entitled to equitable damages, i.e. the rescinding of his K and the return of his down payment.

Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law

  • Plaintiff needed a degree from an accredited university to be barred and practice in New Jersey.
  • Defendant, an unaccredited university, and its representatives led plaintiff to believe that the university was soon to receive accreditation.
  • The school’s representatives knew that plaintiff wanted to practice in N.J.
  • Issue: Did the school’s representatives have a duty not to mislead the plaintiff into believing that it was soon to receive accreditation? Could the defendants assert the defense that they had not misrepresented facts, but instead had only offered opinions?
  • Holding: The school clearly knew that it was unlikely to receive accreditation, and therefore a representation that it would was not an “opinion,” but a misrepresentation of facts.
  • Rule: A party cannot offer an “opinion” that they know to be contrary to the facts under the guise that it was only an opinion.

Duress

Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson

  • (^) Plaintiff’s husband embezzled $372k from the defendant
  • A representative of the company’s insurer came to plaintiff’s home; asked her to sign two judgment notes which plaintiff understood to mean she was agreeing to pay $160k and that her husband would not go to jail.
  • Plaintiff sued to have the closed judgement reopened when she realized that she had agreed to pay $372k.
  • Issue: Did the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s agreement to the K constitute duress?
  • Holding: Plaintiff had signed the agreement under duress. She had been under the impression that only her assent would keep her husband out of jail, and that she was only agreeing to pay $160k. Germantown’s rep knew or should have known that the plaintiff was extremely emotionally stressed when she agreed and that she did not understand what she was agreeing to.

Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (What rises to the level of duress)

  • Plaintiff had been an employee of the defendant for eighteen years. He had been promoted twice, and both times he had signed an arbitration agreement saying that in the event of dispute he would submit to arbitration.
  • He was not comfortable with the arbitration agreement, but was told that if he wouldn’t sign the agreement he would be fired.
  • He signed the agreement, but put the initials “U.D.” with his name to signify that he was under duress. Claimed he needed the job to support his family.
  • Issue: Whether plaintiff was bound by arbitration.
  • Holding: The “threat” of losing a job is not enough to count as duress.

Duress and K Modification

Austin Instruments, Inc. v. Loral Corp. (Threat of breach as duress)

  • Defendant was awarded a navy K to make radar sets.
  • Needed 40 subcontracts, 23 were awarded to plaintiff.
  • The next year, defendant got second K, subcontracted with plaintiff again.
  • (^) Plaintiff refused to accept unless it is awarded all 40 parts, or else it will breach the original K.
  • Defendant looked into getting the parts elsewhere. Could not find parts for the same price or within the time constraints. Agreed to plaintiff’s conditions.
  • Issue: Was the threat of breach of K enough to show that the modification was under economic duress? Did Loral take all reasonable steps to try to find an alternative to agreeing to the modification?
  • Holding: The threat was enough for economic duress because if Loral had allowed Austin to breach and then sued for damages it still would have lost the navy K. It had taken reasonable steps to try to find a replacement subcontractor, and it had been unable to find one.

Unconscionability

Feldman v. Google (competent party entering a K)

  • Plaintiff had a “pay-per-click” advertisement running on Google.
  • Alleged that the defendant was aware of and ambivalent to the fact that third parties were clicking on the link multiple times to drive up the cost of the ad.
  • Plaintiff’s K with Google included a forum selection clause; plaintiff says clause unconscionable.
  • In order to run the ad, plaintiff had to create an online account. The account could not be created unless the plaintiff clicked a box that said he had read the K.
  • Issue: Whether the forum selection clause in an internet clickwrap agreement was enforceable.
  • Holding: Plaintiff was competent to read the K; he should have been more careful in “signing” it. The forum selection clause was not unconscionable because Google has customers all over the world so it is impractical for it to come to them.

Lhotka v. GeoExs (unconscionable terms that limit recovery, severing unconscionable portions)

  • Plaintiff and son went on a trip with the defendant corporation. Son dies.
  • Plaintiff had to sign agreement clearing the defendant of all liability for accidents before going on trip. The only damages the plaintiff was to be entitled to was the cost of her travel.

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  • Holding: Defendant more at fault than plaintiff (lawyer should have known the law). Transaction already complete; public good could not be protected by refusing to enforce the K. Therefore, it was enforceable.
  • Rule: Exception to the general rule that illegal Ks cannot be enforced: If the conduct has already been completed, the rule should not be applied (harm already done).

Ks in violation of Public Policy

Woodman v. Kera LLC

  • Plaintiff’s child was injured at a birthday party at defendant company.
  • Father of the child signed a liability waiver on behalf of the child before the party.
  • Defendant counters that the suit is barred under the liability waiver that the father signed on behalf of the child.
  • General Rule: Common law held that parents cannot waive liability on behalf of their children.
  • Issue: Should the court reverse the common law rule that parents cannot waive liability on behalf of children, thereby making the father’s waiver of claim valid?
  • Holding: Court does not overturn common law rule. It is in the best interest of the public policy to allow the legislature to change the rule if they so choose because they are best equipped to do so.

Syncom Industries v. Wood

  • Defendants had been employees of the plaintiff. In K, defendants agreed to a non-compete for 36 months after termination.
  • Defendant Wood asked his father for a loan of $30k to open a business in competition with plaintiff, and was subsequently fired.
  • Defendant Hogan had been an employee of the plaintiff, but was terminated, then hired by Defendant Wood.
  • General Rule: Restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable.
    • (^) It is reasonable if it is in place to protect the legitimate interests of the company, and if it is narrowly tailored to that purpose.
  • Issue: Were the restrictions of the Ks overly broad and unreasonable?
  • Holding: The Ks bound the defendants to not interfere with any of plaintiff’s customers at all, then or in the future, even those customers with whom the defendants had had no interaction within the scope of their employment with the plaintiff. These agreements were therefore too broad, and went against the public good, which was in favor of competition. The Ks were unenforceable.

Incapacity

Foss v. Circuit City (minority)

  • Plaintiff filled out the online application, which required minors to have a parent sign, for employment with the defendant.
  • In order to start working with defendant, plaintiff had to also sign a hard copy of K. The parent was not required to sign the hard copy.
  • Plaintiff was fired, sued.
  • K had an arbitration clause that forced the plaintiff into arbitration.
    • Plaintiff asserts minority as a defense to avoid the K.
    • Defendant admits that the plaintiff was a minor when the K was formed, but asserts that he ratified the K by his deeds and by regularly submitting a time card clocking his hours.
  • General Rule: In the common law, an individual who had made a K as a minor could ratify the K by actions after reaching the age of majority. However, under Massachusetts law, the individual had to ratify the K in writing.
  • Issue: Was the decision of infancy better left to the arbiter or to the courts?
  • Holding: The K to compel arbitration was not valid. The hard copy K did not have the signature of the minor’s parent, and therefore it had not been validated. In addition, since the plaintiff had never ratified the K in writing, it was invalid under Massachusetts law.

In Re Seminole Walls & Ceiling Corp.

  • (^) Defendant, life-long unsuccessful photographer, took many famous photos of noted celebrities, including Marilyn Monroe.
  • Plaintiff claimed it owned the photograph collection in question because the defendant signed an agreement to have the Plaintiff sell it for them to split the proceeds.
  • A physician had diagnosed defendant with having had a stroke before signing the K = he could not have been capable at time of K formation.
  • Issue: Whether or not defendant had been mentally incapacitated at the time of K formation.
  • Holding: Defendant was capable at the time of K formation. There had been little change in how he was before and after his stroke. Therefore the K was enforceable.

Farnum v. Silvano

  • Plaintiff was elderly and had had numerous mental problems.
  • She formed a K with defendant to sell her house, worth $115k, for $64,900.
  • Defendant knew that she was incapacitated.
  • Issue: Was the plaintiff capable at the time of K formation?
  • Holding: The plaintiff was not capable at the time of K formation. The court orders the defendant to return the deed to the plaintiff’s nephew, and the plaintiff had to return the money to plaintiff.

Interpretation

Rycon Specialty Foods v. Wellshire Farms (discoverability it Ks, master and exclusive distributors)

  • Plaintiff sold cheese to defendant, and the defendant subsequently sold it to others.
  • Plaintiff began to sell cheese to other entities.
  • Holding: Court holds that the language of the K was not plain, and therefore the evidence was admissible. Plain meaning approach ignores the intentions of the parties. You cannot determine the meaning of the K without considering the context of the K.

White City Shopping Center v. PR Restaurants

  • Facts: Panera contracted with shopping center. K exclusivity clause said that no other restaurants which sell sandwiches could be in shopping center.
  • Q’doba moved into the shopping center and Panera sued to have them removed.
  • Issue: Are burritos, tacos, and quesadillas sandwiches?
  • Holding: The plain meaning of sandwich is clear, and most reasonable people would not consider burritos, tacos, and quesadillas to be sandwiches.

Construction

United Airlines v. Good Taste Inc.

  • Parties had 3-year K with a 90 notice of termination clause.
  • Plaintiff’s argued that Defendant had assured them that that provision had never been used in the past, and claim breach of K.
  • Issue:
    • Was there a breach of K?
    • Had United acted in good faith assuring the plaintiff that it had never been used?
  • Holding: The 90 days provision is clear and United fulfilled. It did not breach; gave plaintiffs adequate notice. There had been no breach.

Parol Evidence Rule

Masterson v. Sine

  • Plaintiffs had option to purchase land for 10 years. Went bankrupt, trustees try to buy the property. Defendant said that the option only applied to plaintiff and was not transferable.
  • Over the grantees’ objection, the trial court admitted extrinsic evidence showing that the repurchase price was a specified sum plus the cost of improvements less their depreciation value.
  • The trial court also determined that the parol evidence rule barred extrinsic evidence offered by the grantees to show that the parties intended to keep the property in the family and the option could not be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy.
  • Issue: Whether the parties intended their writing to serve as the exclusive agreement. Whether the agreement “appeared complete.”
  • Holding: Although the trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence of the purchase prices, it erred in excluding the extrinsic evidence showing that the option was personal to the grantors. Even when the court is applying the 4-corners approach, it still has to take a “sideway glance” at the outside evidence.

Myskina v. Conde Nast Publications

  • Defendants claimed that plaintiff consented in writing to their unrestricted editorial use of her photographs.
  • Parties agreed that defendant had the rights to the photos. Plaintiff claimed there was a subsequent oral agreement that only one photo would be used.
  • (^) Plaintiff signed a release allowing the unrestricted editorial use of her photographs by defendants.
  • Issue: Whether the alleged oral agreement limiting plaintiff’s consent to publication of her photographs was barred by the parol evidence rule.
  • Holding: Summary judgment was granted for defendants. Plaintiff was barred from brining evidence of her claim because it contradicted the writing in violation of the parol evidence rule.

Lopez v. Reynoso

  • Plaintiff bought car from the defendant. Stopped making payments, defendant repossessed the car.
  • Both parties wanted to introduce evidence as to what the actual price of the car was under the K.
  • Issue: Should the trial court have admitted the defendant’s outside evidence? Did that evidence contradict the language of the K? Was the K fully integrated?
  • Holding: The trial court properly admitted the outside evidence, because the K was not fully integrated. Even though there was a merger clause, the boilerplate language made the clause irrelevant.

Escape from Parol Evidence Rule

Sound Techniques, Inc. v. Hoffman (negligent misrepresentation)

  • Plaintiff recording studio moved in over a nightclub.
  • Nightclub agent told plaintiff that the bar did not play loud music and it was just going to be expending its dining area.
  • Nightclub was so loud that the building shook. Plaintiff’s business was significantly impacted.
  • Plaintiff wanted to introduce outside evidence that the defendant assured that it would be quiet.
  • Issue: Whether the outside evidence was admissible. Whether the K’s merger clause applied to negligent misrepresentation.
  • Holding: The testimony was not admissible, and the merger clause did not apply because there was no intent to misrepresent (Recording studio loses)

Misunderstanding and Mistake

Konic International Corp. v. Spokane Computer Services

  • Defendant searching for a surge protector. Plaintiff priced their surge protector at “fifty-six twenty.” Defendant employee interpreted it to mean $56.20, when the Konic rep had meant $5,620.
  • Both parties missed the error on their respective purchase orders.
  • President of Spokane realized that the surge protector was too expensive, and ordered it sent back.